Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 4

Article 10

2001

MIT v. Yoo: Revocation of Academic Degrees for Non-Academic
Reasons
Jayme L. Butcher

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jayme L. Butcher, MIT v. Yoo: Revocation of Academic Degrees for Non-Academic Reasons, 51 Case W.
Rsrv. L. Rev. 749 (2001)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol51/iss4/10

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

MIT v. YOo: REVOCATION OF
ACADEMIC DEGREES FOR NONACADEMIC REASONS
INTRODUCTION

A professor of English at an Illinois university once described an
assignment he gave his incoming freshmen that involved "The Monster," an essay written by Deems Taylor.' In his essay "Taylor described a despicable man, someone impossible to admire, let alone to
love. Only at the end of that essay did Taylor reveal the true identity
of his subject: the German composer Richard Wagner."2 The assignment was intended to teach the lesson that "accomplishment in the
arts and in other endeavors is not always accompanied.by agreeable
behavior, but that accomplishment cannot be denied solely because of
one's behavior." 3 Freshman English majors are not the only people
who might benefit from this lesson. Educators and courts should appreciate and consider the wisdom of this lesson as they face the issue
of degree revocation for non-academic violations. Just as Wagner's
musical compositions should not be judged according to his behavior,
an otherwise-qualified university graduate's diploma should not be
revoked simply because the university disapproves of the graduate's
non-academic conduct.4
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") recently revoked the degree of 1998 graduate Charles Yoo for his alleged involvement in the death of Scott Krueger, a freshman fraternity
pledge.5 Yoo was a pledge trainer in the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity
at MIT at the time of the fraternity incident that caused Krueger's
death. The university revoked Yoo's degree for five years on the ba-

1

See R Baird Shuman, Letter to the Editor, Accomplishment and Bad Behavior, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 24, 1997, at B I1.
2 id.
3

id,

4 See id. (arguing that it was a "travesty" for Johns Hopkins University to withhold a

degree from a convicted murderer who had met all substantive degree requirements).
5 See Leo Reisberg, M.IT. Revokes Diploma of Graduatefor Alleged Role in Drinking
Death of Freshman, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 13, 1999, at A4 (describing the incident and
MIT's response).
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sis of allegations that he had purchased the alcohol and had instructed
6
pledges on the amount of alcohol they were expected to consume.
A year after Scott Krueger's death, the Suffolk County district
attorney sued the fraternity. The case was eventually dropped for
lack of a defendant because the fraternity had dissolved after the incident.7 In addition to temporarily revoking Yoo's degree, MIT paid
the Krueger family six million dollars for the college's role in the
tragic incident. 8 MIT President Charles Vest apologized to the family, stating: "[d]espite your trust in MIT, things went terribly awry,
[sic] at a very personal level, I feel that we at MIT failed you and
Scott. For this you have our profound apology." 9
The decision to revoke the degree based upon Yoo's alleged
misconduct has not gone unnoticed. The decision has proven controversial, both in legal and educational circles. Alan Charles Kors, a
professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, for 0example,
has criticized MIT's action as "an arrogant abuse of power."'
In response to MIT's revocation of his degree, Yoo filed suit in
Middlesex Superior Court on November 16, 1999, claiming that the
university violated its own rules as well as the concept of fundamental
fairness in revoking his degree.11 The case is presently in the discovery stage. The lawsuit seeks reinstatement of Yoo's degree and12
monetary damages for the impact of the revocation on Yoo's career.
Yoo had planned to attend graduate school, but it will be impossible
to continue his education without an undergraduate degree.' 3 Charles
Yoo 14spent $100,000 on the MIT degree that has been taken from
him.

6 See id. (noting that "[tihe action mark[ed] a rare, if not unprecedented, effort by a university to discipline an alumnus for a non-academic violation that took place during college").
7 See Kate Zemike, M.IT. Withdraws Diploma Over Drinking Death at Frat,BOSTON
GLOBE, July 31, 1999, at B3. The event prompted the university to make plans to build a new
dormitory, and to change the current campus requirements in order to ensure that all freshmen
live on campus rather than in a fraternity house. See id.
8 See Leo Reisberg, M.I.T. Pays 6 Million to Settle Lawsuit over a Student's Death,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 29, 2000, at A49. The settlement included a $1.25 million payment to endow a scholarship in Scott Krueger's name and a $4.75 million payment to the family. See id.
9 Editorial, A Tragedy and an Apology, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2000, at 30 (quoting Vest's
apology).
I Andrea Billups, Ex-Student Sues MIT Over Revoked Diploma, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1999, at C5 (quoting Professor Kors).
" See Ralph Ranalli, MIT Grad Files Lawsuit over Degree Suspension, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 17, 1999, at F12 (the suit claimed that Yoo was never permitted a chance to answer allegations against him during the university hearing and was given no opportunity to confront his
accusers).
12 See id.
'3 See Zemike, supra note 7, at B3.
14 See Laurel J. Sweet, Krueger's Frat Pledge Trainer Sues MIT to Get Degree Back,
BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 17, 1999, at 26.
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Yoo's career advancement is on hold due to the university's unfair and arbitrary decision to revoke his degree. Yoo was never
criminally charged or held responsible during his time at MIT, and
yet the university decided, without procedural safeguards in place to
protect Yoo, to revoke his degree for five years. Such a flagrant
abuse of power should not be permitted.
Courts have often dealt with degree revocation for academic reasons such as plagiarism and fraud, but degree revocation for nonacademic misconduct is a new issue. Part L.A examines the courts'
treatment of students who have been suspended and expelled in the
public and private school setting. Part I.B looks at how courts have
traditionally dealt with universities' decisions to withhold academic
degrees for academic reasons such as plagiarism and fraud. Part I.C
critically examines the way courts have dealt with the revocation of
academic degrees for academic reasons, i.e., where the plagiarism or
fraud is discovered after the degree has been conferred.
Part I.D begins the look into courts' treatment of decisions to
punish students for non-academic incidents. Part D looks at how
courts have dealt with the suspending or expulsion of students for
non-academic reasons. Part I.E examines the withholding of degrees
for non-academic reasons.
Part lI.A analyzes the impact of a recent case involving the revocation of a degree for non-academic reasons by the University of Virginia on the pending MIT case. Part ll.B looks at the varied and numerous problems involved in permitting universities to revoke academic degrees for non-academic reasons. Part ll.C suggests a model
to address the problems involved in degree revocation for nonacademic reasons including the adopting of strict procedures for the
universities to follow, and having the courts preside over the matter.
Universities should not be permitted to revoke academic degrees for
non-academic reasons due to the possible abuse and unfairness to the
former student. If revocation is permitted, however, then safeguards
must be in place and the suggested model should be adopted.
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TREATMENT OF UNIVERSITY-STUDENT RELATIONS

A. InstitutionalSuspensions and Expulsions of StudentsforAcademic
Reasons
1. Suspension and Expulsion in the PublicSchool Setting
Courts have long deferred to universities' decisions to suspend
or expel students on grounds of academic misconduct,' 5 even though
students who wish to pursue a grievance against a public university
are protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend16
ment.
In Board of Curatorsof University of Missouri v. Horowitz,17 the
Supreme Court held that, in cases of an academic nature, great deference must be given to a state university's academic decisions: "'Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint."' 18 The Horowitz
Court concluded that a former medical student had been properly
dismissed from the University of Missouri due to academic deficiencies. 19 The student's claims of deprivation of liberty due to the dismissal's effect on future employment in the medical field and violation of procedural due process were held to be groundless. 20 The
Court held that "[a]ssuming the existence of a liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as
the fourteenth amendment requires." 2' By telling the student of the
problem, carefully deciding whether to dismiss her, and using inde-

15 See Thomas A. Schweitzer, "Academic Challenge" Cases: Should Judicial Review
Extend to Academic Evaluationsof Student?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 267, 272-73 (1992). The deference courts show to educators stems from the common law: "It has been called an integral part
of our vital tradition of academic freedom, and it has won unanimous endorsement in recent
years from the United States Supreme Court." Id.
16 See Curtis Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline:A Guide to FairProcessfor
the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 290 (1999) ("Federal courts view the student's
continued enrollment as a protected property interest, immune from arbitrary state action.
Resting on due process grounds, this protection has both a substantive and a procedural side.
The outcome as well as the process of establishing the student's guilt must be fair ....
").
17 435 U.S. 78 (1978). The Horowitz Court noted that courts traditionally have held
educational institutions to less stringent procedural requirements in cases involving the failure of
students to meet academic standards than in cases involving student violations of rules of conduct. See id. at 86-91.
's Id. at 91 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
19 See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79. The school told the student of the faculty's dissatisfaction with her progress and the possibility that she would not graduate because of it. The university even took extra steps to ensure that its decision was sound by having seven independent
doctors evaluate the student. The school's actions were found sufficient to satisfy due process.
20 See id. at 84.
21 Id. at 85.
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pendent physicians to evaluate her, the university had gone above and
beyond the due process requirements in an academic setting.22
The Court further stated that a hearing is not necessary in cases
involving academic dismissals,23 in this context distinguishing academic dismissals from disciplinary dismissals.24 In this context the
Court quoted Barnardv. Inhabitantsof Shelburne:
[Disciplinary cases have] no application [in academic cases]
... [m]isconduct is a very different matter from failure to attain a standard of excellence in studies. A determination as
to the facts involves investigation of a quite different kind. A
public hearing may be regarded as helpful to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out the
truth about scholarship.25
The Court noted consistent judicial rejection of the argument that students excluded on academic grounds must be granted a hearing, 26 and
explained why courts treat academic dismissals differently than sanctions meted out for misconduct:
Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual
professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course,
the determination of whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools
of judicial or administrative decision-making.
Decisions after Horowitz have followed the Supreme Court's
reasoning regarding the procedural difference between academic and
disciplinary violations. In 1996, for example, the Indiana Court of
Appeals stated in Reilly v. Daley2 8:
It is without question that a student's interest in pursuing an
education is included within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protections of liberty and property and that a student facing
expulsion or suspension from a public educational institution
is therefore entitled to the protections of due process. The
2
2
2
25

See id.
See id at 86.

See id.
IL at 87 (quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 103 N.E. 1095, 1097 (Mass.

1913)).
26See id. at 87-88.
27 Id. at 90.
2' 666 N.E.2d 439 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996).
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due process required in a school suspension or dismissal proceeding is dependent upon whether the hearing is academic
or disciplinary. In the case of academic dismissal, due process requires only the barest procedural protections.2 9
Similarly, in Harris v. Blake,30 the Tenth Circuit upheld a Colorado
university's decision to require one of its students to withdraw due to
his academic incompetence. The court discussed the difference be31
tween academic and disciplinary procedures, following Horowitz.
Because Harrisinvolved an academic violation rather than a disciplinary problem, the Tenth Circuit held that a hearing was not required
to satisfy due process.32 The Tenth Circuit reasoned:
The Supreme Court has emphasized that less stringent procedural requirements attach when a school makes an academic
judgment about a student than when it takes disciplinary action .... The Court held that the process [the student] received, notice followed by a careful and deliberate
33 determination, satisfied the requirements of due process.
The Supreme Court reiterated its judicial deference to universities in 1986 in University of Michigan v. Ewing,34 which involved a
dismissal due to poor academic performance and a low score on
medical board exams. As in Horowitz, the Court held that, even if the
student had a protectable property interest in continued enrollment,
the student's due process rights were not violated since the record did
not indicate arbitrary action by the university.35 The Court noted that
courts must show deference to the educational institution in reviewing
academic decisions and may only overturn a decision when "it is such
a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exer36
cise professional judgment.'

29

Id. at 444.

30 798 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1986).
31 See id at 423.
32

See id.

33 Id.
34 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
31 See id. at 227-28 (holding that the university had adequate grounds for dismissing the

student).
36

Id. at 225 (1985).
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2. Suspension and Expulsion in the PrivateSchool Setting
There is no constitutional requirement of due process in the private school setting.37 Consequently, students must look elsewhere for
protection against arbitrary suspensions and expulsions from private
universities-namely, to the law of contracts and associations. 3' The
contractual equivalent of due process in the39-private realm is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In Clayton v. PrincetonUniversity,40 the court upheld the university's decision to suspend a student from the university for cheating
on a final examination, based on the student-university relationship as
defined in the law of associations. 41 Noting the difference between
private and public institutions and the importance of the private institution's autonomy, the Clayton court did not require a hearing to
ensure fundamental fairness in the decision to suspend or expel a student. Instead, it merely required adequate procedures "to safeguard a
student from being unfairly convicted of cheating." 42 Princeton's
procedures regarding honor code violations were held to be adequate,
and thus the Clayton court determined that the student had not been
unfairly suspended.4 3
A private university might be bound to afford students a hearing,
however, if the university's student handbook provides for one. In
1984, the Eighth Circuit held, in Corso v. Creighton University,44 that
a student's expulsion from the university for cheating was improper
because the student had not been given a right to a hearing before expulsion as provided for in the student handbook. The private university was found to have breached its contract with the student by not
abiding by the handbook's terms. 45 Nevertheless, the same deference
37 See Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 291 ("Courts have refused to find "state action,"
the precondition to due process analysis, in the case of private schools, even though most receive heavy financial aid and other forms of government support.").

3sSee i&2

39 See id.("Contract law... [is] the bulwark for the private school student, and there is no
reason why that protection should ordinarily be less than a public school student receives under
the federal Constitution. in some instances, contract law may provide even greater process.").
40 608 F. Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1985).
41 See id.at 438 (noting that the "[1]aw of associations in New Jersey has, in general,
always afforded deference to the internal decision-making process of a private organization").
2 Id. at 439.

43 See id.(concluding that the "procedures were adequate to safeguard a student from
being unduly convicted of cheating").
4 731 F.2d 529, 533 (1984); cf Lyon College v. Gray, 999 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that, because the college had followed the procedures set out in the student
handbook regarding suspension for cheating, there was no violation of procedural due process).
45 See Corso, 731 F.2d at 533. The student handbook provided that in cases where a
serious penalty was imposed (such as expulsion in this case) the student is entitled to a hearing
before a university committee and has the right to appeal the findings made by the committee.
The plaintiff was not given a hearing and therefore the court held that he was not given his
rights under the contract. See id.
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afforded public universities in due process analysis
given
••
-is generally
46
to private universities in matters of academic violations.
To satisfy
the fundamental fairness requirement, it is only necessary that public
and private universities demonstrate that the academic decisions are
not arbitrary.
B. The Withholding ofAcademic Degreesfor Academic Reasons
In cases involving student suspension and expulsion for academic reasons in a public school setting, the courts are clear that a
hearing is not required to fulfill due process. The courts are also consistent in their decisions involving the withholding of degrees for
academic violations in that they do not require a hearing.4 Courts
discuss the difference between academic and non-academic violations
in cases regarding withholding of degrees in the same way that they
discuss the topic in suspension and expulsion cases.
In Mahavongsananv. Hall, a graduate student brought an action
to force the University of Georgia to award her degree.4 The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision to grant the degree by
finding that, in this academic violation case, the lower court had incorrectly applied the standards used in review of disciplinary violations. 49 The appellate court noted that "the due process requirements
of notice and hearing ... have been carefully limited to disciplinary
decisions.,, 50 The court applied the same logic used in the cases regarding suspension or expulsion. The Mahavongsanan court discussed the distinction between disciplinary problems and academic
dismissals at length, stating: "A hearing may be required to determine
charges of misconduct, but a hearing may be useless or harmful in
finding out the truth concerning scholarship. There is a clear dichotomy between a student's due process rights in disciplinary dismissals
and in academic dismissals."
The university satisfied the require-

See id. ("[P]art of the court's reasoning was based on the deference courts should show
to the expert opinion of faculty members in academic judgments.").
47 See generally Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding university's decision to withhold degree after student twice failed an examination required for graduation); Cieboter v. O'Connell, 236 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (denying student's petition to force university to consider his dissertation); Napolitano v. Princeton Univ., 186 NJ.
Super. 548, 453 A.2d 263 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982) (upholding university's decision to withhold
student's degree for one year due to academic fraud).
48 See Mahavongsanan,529 F.2d at 448.
49 See id. at 449-50 (noting that the "district court's grant of relief [was] based on
a confusion of the court's power to review disciplinaryactions by educational institutions on the one
hand, and academic decisions on the other") (emphasis in original).
'o Id. at 449.
-" Id. at 450.
46
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decision be reasonable, and the court refused to grant
ment that their
52
the degree.
Similarly, the court in Cieboter v. O'Connel5 3 refused to force a
university to consider a dissertation where the student in question had
not fulfilled the graduate school's requirements. The Florida court,
like the other courts, held that the University of Florida did not have
to consider the dissertation because "[t]hese are determinations which
fall peculiarly within the competence of the University officials
charged with the responsibility of granting doctorate degrees only to
students whom they find to be fully qualified in all respects and for
whose competence the University must vouch. 54 The courts agree
that universities have discretion regarding academic considerations
due to the universities' expertise in the area of education, and as long
as the decision is not arbitrary, there is no violation of due process.
A private university's decision to withhold a degree for academic reasons is evaluated in the same manner as a private university's decision to suspend or expel a student. In Napolitano v.
example, Princeton withheld a student's
Princeton University,Ffor
degree for one year because of academic fraud.56 The Napolitano
court held that deference should be given to the institution, recognizing "the necessity for independence of a university in dealing with the
academic failures, transgressions or problems of a student., 57 The
Napolitano court further stresses the relationship between university
and student in describing the latitude given to private universities in
this context:
The education process is not by nature adversary; instead it
centers around a continuing relationship between faculty and
students, "one in which the teacher must occupy many
roles--educator, adviser, friend, and at times, parentsubstitute." We decline to further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty-student relationship. 8

52 See id. The university had given the student timely notice of the examination requirement, and also gave her time to prepare after she failed the first time. See id.
5' 236 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
54 Id. at473.
55 453 A.2d 263 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1982).
56 See id. (explaining the student's violation of plagiarism in her final paper).
57 Id. at 274.
58 Id. at 275 (citation omitted).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:749

The Napolitano court concluded that Princeton's decision to withhold
the degree was valid and reasonable and that the fact-finding procedure used to uncover the plagiarism was adequate.59
Courts have been consistent in their reasoning in academic violation cases when a suspension or expulsion is at issue, or the withholding of a degree is involved, in both the private and public institution context. A hearing is not required in either context, as it is in a
non-academic situation. Courts leave matters of academics to the
institutions and do not interfere with their decisions unless the decision is arbitrary.
C. The Revocation of Academic Degreesfor Academic Reasons
Courts apply a higher level of scrutiny in degree revocation
cases, showing much less deference than in the suspension, expulsion,
and even degree withholding cases. The Ohio Supreme Court's 1986
decision in Waliga v. Kent State University60 is often cited on this
point. The Waliga court permitted Kent State to revoke the degrees
of two graduates, who had graduated in 1966 and 1967, respectively,
after the university discovered that the students had not actually satisfied substantive degree requirements. 61 The Waliga court held that
universities have the power to revoke academic degrees "for proper
cause after affording constitutionally adequate procedure." 62 The
Waliga court held that a hearing must be held prior to the revocation,
and it must be "a fair hearing at which [the student] can present evidence and protect his interest.' 63 The stricter procedural requirements
in this context are a result of the more serious nature of degree revocation, as compared to a mere suspension or the withholding of a degree. Given the graduate's property interest in his degree, the court
determined that due process requires a public university to provide
a
64
hearing at which the graduate can present his side of the story.
Other courts have followed Waliga in degree revocation cases.
In Crook v. Baker,65 for example, the Sixth Circuit determined that
the University of Michigan had satisfied the due process requirements
in revoking an academic degree from a graduate. The Crook court
quoted at length from the Waliga opinion in reaching this conclusion:
Academic degrees are a certification to the world at large of
the recipient's educational achievement and fulfillment of the
59 See id.
60

488 N.E.2d 850 (Ohio 1986).

62

Id. at 853.

63

Id. at 852.

6' Seeid. at851.

64 See id. at 853.
65

813 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1987).
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institution's standards. To hold that a university may never
withdraw a degree, effectively requires the university to continue making a false certification to the public at large of the
accomplishment of persons who in fact lack the very qualifications that are certified. Such a holding would undermine
public confidence in the integrity of degrees, call academic
standards into question, and harm those who rely on the certification, which the degree represents.6 6
Private universities, like public universities, must provide graduates with "procedural fairness" before revoking their degrees for academic reasons. 67 For example, Reams discusses an unreported California case in which the appellate court held that a private university
student is entitled to procedural fairness in the degree revocation
context because the revocation of the degree signified the removal of
a significant interest. The court found that because the university informed the plaintiff of the charges against him and of the procedures
to be used, the requirement of fairness had been satisfied.6 8
In cases involving degree revocation for academic reasons, the
only way the degree of the graduate may properly be revoked is to
give the graduate a fair hearing, thereby satisfying the due process
and fundamental fairness requirements. This is a more stringent requirement than is practiced in cases involving suspension and withholding of a degree.
D. Student Suspension or Expulsion of Studentsfor Non-Academic
Reasons
It is well established that for an institution to properly suspend or
expel a student for non-academic reasons, it must conduct a hearing.
Horowitz explains that disciplinary violations require fact-finding, but
that academic violations require only the informed judgment of educators. 69 This rule is followed in cases discussing the suspension or
expulsion of students for non-academic reasons. The rule was first
set forth in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,7 0 in which
the Supreme Court decided that due process required notice and some
opportunity for a hearing before students could be expelled for misconduct. 7 '
66

Id. at 93 (quoting Waliga v. Kent State Univ., 488 N.E. 2d 850, 852 (Ohio 1986)).

See Bernard Reams Jr., Revocation of Academic Degrees by Colleges and Universities,
14 J.C. & U.L 283,300 (1987).
68 See id. at 301 (discussing the Abalkhail case).
6 See Board of Curators of Univ. ofMo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87-91 (1978).
70 294 F.2d 150 (5thCir. 1961).
71 See id' at 158-59. The university expelled the students without ever giving a specific
reason for the expulsion other than "this problem of Alabama State College" following demonstrations. Id. at 151-53.
67

760
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In Wright v. Texas Southern University,72 the Fifth Circuit upheld a student's expulsion over his complaints that the university's
action was unfounded. The Wright court held that a student "must be
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to make his defense to the
charges and to receive such a hearing as meets the requirements of
justice, both to the school and himself."73 The student in Wright,
however, had been given both notice and a fair hearing during which
he was given an opportunity to present a defense to the allegations, 74
and thus the due process requirement that a state university must meet
to properly expel a student for non-academic reasons had been satisfied.
Other courts have suggested that additional procedures may be
necessary to comply with due process. Thus, in Gorman v. University
of Rhode Island, the First Circuit held that notice and a hearing are
established due process requirements, but that in certain cases additional procedures may be warranted.7 6 The Gorman court stated that
weighing and balancing competing interests unique to each individual
case is necessary to determine which additional procedural requirements, if any, are necessary to guarantee fairness.
At minimum, then, state supported schools must provide notice
of the offense and a hearing in order to satisfy the due process requirements. In the private university setting, the constitutional safeguards do not protect students from expulsion or suspension for nonacademic reasons, but private universities cannot dismiss a student
without reason. In Tedeschi v. Wagner College,78 for example, the
New York Court of Appeals held that, regardless of what theory is
used to define the relationship between the university and the student,
if the university has established procedural guidelines to follow in
disciplining a student, it must follow these guidelines. Similarly, in
Schaer v. Brandeis University,79 a Massachusetts court held that pri72

392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).

71 Id. at 729.
74 See id. at 729-30.

7- 837 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988). The Gorman court noted that, while "[n]otice and opportunity to be heard have traditionally and consistently been held to be the essential requisites of
procedural due process ... [b]eyond the right to notice and hearing, the span of procedural
protections required to ensure fairness becomes uncertain." Id. at 13-14.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 13 (holding that the need for procedures beyond notice and a hearing "must
be determined by a careful weighting or balancing of the competing interests implicated in the
particular case").
78 404 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1980). The Tedeschi court held that, because the university
guidelines required a hearing, the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing before the board and the
president before she could be suspended. See id. at 1306.
79 716 N.E.2d 1055 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999), rev'd in part,432 Mass. 747 (Mass. 2000).
Appealing to common-law principles governing private associations, the Schaer court held that
students facing expulsion are entitled to substantial, but not rigid, adherence to the procedures
memorialized in student code. See id. at 1061.
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vate colleges must comply with the procedures they establish for
themselves. Although the Schaer court viewed the relationship between student and university as an association rather than a contract,
it reached the same conclusion as the Tedeschi court-namely, that a
private university must adhere to its own rules to ensure fundamental
fairness in decisions to suspend or expel students.
This is quite different from the academic violation cases in
which courts gave the educators wide latitude. In those cases it was
not until the degree was actually revoked that courts required something beyond "fundamental fairness," namely notice and a hearing.
The seriousness of revocation demanded this tactic even in the area of
academic offenses. In the case of suspending or expelling a student
due to conduct, the public school student is entitled to notice and a
hearing; and in the private setting the university is required to follow
its own rules. The courts will overturn any action by the university
that is arbitrary, capricious, and not fair to the student.
E. The Withholding of Degreesfor Non-Academic Reasons
Courts are more stringent in non-academic cases involving suspension and expulsion, and they are just as stringent when universities
withhold degrees for non-academic violations. A hearing and notice
are required. There are other considerations as well. For example,
does a university have the authority to withdraw a degree from a potential graduate who has fulfilled his academic requirements but
commits a disciplinary violation prior to graduation? In People ex
rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School,80 a student, after completion
of final examinations but prior to graduation, acted in a manner "justifying the refusal of the faculty to recommend [the student as one to]
whom a degree should be conferred." 8 ' The court upheld the withholding of the degree, noting that there is no substantive distinction
between matriculating students and those who have completed final
exams but have yet to receive a degree. 2
In Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College,8 3 a college refused to
grant a degree to a student because of rumored homosexual conduct
even though he had completed all of his academic requirements. The
student withdrew when the university threatened to dismiss him with
the reason stamped on his transcript. 84 The Illinois appellate court
held that, in contract, a college cannot "maliciously or in bad faith
0 22 N.Y.S. 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1893).
8t Id. at 665. The case does not specify the nature of the student's offense.
82 See id. at 665-66 (finding "no reason why the right to discipline is not as great between
the final examination and the graduation as before").
83 501 N.E.2d 1380 (11. App. Ct. 1986).
8 See id. at 1382 ("Afraid that the accusation of homosexuality being imprinted on his
transcript would destroy his career goal, the student withdrew from college.").
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refuse to grant a degree
85 to a student who has fulfilled the requirements for graduation."
In 1997, Johns Hopkins denied a diploma to a student who
pleaded guilty to the murder of a fellow student.86 The student had
fulfilled all of the academic requirements a few months before the
shooting and was waiting to receive his degree in the spring at the
once yearly graduation ceremony. 87 He unsuccessfully sued the university because it withheld his degree after the incident.8 8 The student
argued that he was no longer a student because he had completed
courses at the school, and thus that he was no longer within the
school's jurisdiction. 89 In Harwood v. John Hopkins University, the
Maryland court held that the university had the power to withhold the
degree because that student's 90violation of its code of conduct
amounted to a breach of contract.
The Harwood court discussed cases involving Christian universities refusing to confer degrees when the students behaved contrary
to the terms of student handbooks. 91 Although the university has the
power to withhold the diploma when the student does not comply
with the terms of the handbook, the university has a duty to "not act
maliciously or in bad faith by arbitrarily and capriciously refusing to
award a degree to a student who fulfills the degree requirements." 92
The Harwood court held that Johns Hopkins had not acted arbitrarily
or capriciously by requiring the student in question to comply with
the terms of the handbook:

5
86

Id. at 1384 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See No Diplomafor Convicted Killer,WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1997, at D3.

87 See Johns Hopkins Denies Diploma to FormerStudent Who PleadedGuilty in Shooting, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 12, 1997, at A12. The student was convicted of seconddegree murder and weapons charges and is currently serving a thirty-five-year sentence. See id.
88 See Harwood v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 747 A.2d 205, 210-12 (Md. App. 2000), appeal
denied,759 A.2d 231 (Md. 2000).
89 See id. Many courts, including the court in People ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law
School, 22 N.Y.S. 663, 665 (1893), have rejected this proposition.
)o See Harwood,747 A.2d at 211.
91 The cases discussed by the Harwood court included Lexington Theological Seminary,
Inc. v. Vance, 596 S.W.2d 11, 14-15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that it is "ridiculous on its
face" that a seminary should be forced to conform its moral approach to conflicting life style
approaches and holding that a seminary "had every right ... to exercise sound discretion in the
matter of granting a degree to [a homosexual student]"); Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College,
501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (implying that the discretion of religious colleges is
bound only by the duty not to "act maliciously or in bad faith"); and Carr v. St. John's Univ.,
187 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1962) (affirming a lower appellate court holding that dismissal of students
for participation in civil marriage services in contravention of Catholic teaching was within the
proper discretion of the university and thus beyond the scrutiny of the courts).
92 Harwood, 747 A.2d at 209 (quoting Lincoln Christian College, 501 N.E.2d at 1384);
see also Dinu v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 56 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D. Mass.
1999) (finding the suspension and consequent withholding of academic degrees from two students was proper because the students were still within the jurisdiction of the school, even
though they had fulfilled the academic requirements for graduation).

2001]

REVOCATION OF ACADEMIC DEGREES

Dean Boswell timely notified appellant that he was suspended pending the resolution of his criminal case and adequately notified him of the provisions of the Conduct Code
he was charged with violating. Appellant's murder of a fellow student and handgun violations were clear violations of
the Conduct Code. Moreover, the procedures invoked by
Dean Boswell were
93 fair and comported with the requirements
of the Handbook.
Although the university has the power to withhold the degree,
this is not an unbridled freedom. The university still must act fairly
and comply with the procedures established by the handbook. 94
From this discussion, it is apparent that courts have applied more
stringent procedural standards in the case of non-academic violations.
As to public institutions, a hearing and notice are required both in the
suspension and expulsion cases and in cases where schools seek to
withhold academic degrees, and private institutions have a duty not to
act arbitrarily and capriciously. The only instance in which notice
and a hearing are required following academic violations is when the
institution revokes the degree after it has been conferred. It is obvious that the courts treat non-academic violations and degree revocation as the two most serious situations requiring more protections for
the student.
I. ARGUMENT

A. Goodreau v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia9 5
Although the area of degree revocation for non-academic reasons
is new to the courts, Goodreau sheds light on this topic. Goodreau
graduated from the University of Virginia in 1990. A few months
later, it was discovered that he had embezzled funds from a student
organization. 96 In 1996, he asked the university to remove an "enrollment discontinued" notation on his transcript after deciding to
pursue graduate business study.97 University administrators not only

denied his request but initiated degree revocation proceedings against
him. 98 In Goodreau, the district court considered the University of
Virginia's 99motion for summary judgment on claims asserted by
Goodreau.
93 Harwood, 747 A.2d at 214.

See id.
9- 116 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Va. 2000).
96 See id at 698 (student pled guilty to misdemeanor embezzlement).
9' See id. at 699.
9' See ia. at 700.
99 See id. at 697.
9
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This case is important for analyzing the MIT situation because it
suggests an approach that courts might use in cases involving nonacademic degree revocations. The court refused to grant summary
judgment for the university on Goodreau's breach of contract action
against the university.1°° Similarly, the court refused to grant summary judgment for the university on his due process claims. 10 1
Moreover, the court stated that, "[a]t the very least the plaintiff is entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard."' 0 2
The court's refusal to grant the University of Virginia summary
judgment is consistent with the cases involving the suspension, withholding, and revoking of degrees for both academic and nonacademic reasons discussed in this Comment. The troubling portion
of Goodreau, however, is its discussion of the university's power to
revoke a degree, where the court likened academic and non-academic
cases:
[T]he fact that these cases all dealt with academic misconduct, as opposed to a disciplinary infraction such as the one
involved in the present case, does not weaken their value as
authority, for the rationale set forth in those opinions also applies to a University's ability to revoke a degree for a violation of the Honor System. 103
This misstates the law. Academic and non-academic cases have
not been treated similarly in the case law and should not be treated
similarly in the case of degree revocation. Degree revocation is
the most serious action an institution can take against a former student, and it must be handled very carefully. Courts must pay close
attention to the cases that have come before and retain the distinction between academic and non-academic offenses that has been
established in those cases. Degree revocation for non-academic
reasons should be re-evaluated in light of the inherent problems
with such an action. If revocation is permitted under these circumstances, safeguards must be firmly in place to protect former students.

'00 See id. at 702.
'01 See id. at 707.
102 Id. at 704 (citing Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988)).
103 Id. at 703.
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B. Problemsand Issues Involved in the Revocation ofAcademic
Degreesfor Non-Academic Reasons
1. Where Will the Line be Drawn?
The main problem with allowing the revocation of an academic
degree for non-academic reasons is the question of where it will end.
If universities are permitted to revoke degrees years after graduation,
on what grounds may they do so? One author asks, "[w]hat if 20
years from now an MIT alumnus is accused of rape by a woman who
backs up her charge with DNA evidence-would the university revoke his degree?".. May a university revoke the degree of a serial
killer because of the shame of having his name tied to the university?
What about a politician who acts unethically in public office? Could
his alma mater revoke his degree because it disagrees with his actions? This line of questioning raises the troublesome issue of how
far a university may go in controlling the conduct of their studentshow far may it reach?
One author has stated that MIT's actions represent a clear abuse
of power.10 5 Attorney Harvey A. Silvergate likens the specter of de06
gree revocation to a "kind of tyranny over the graduate's life.'
Once students graduate, they expect their degree credential to be permanent. While it can be said that students who achieve their degree
through academic fraud do not really earn the degree, students who
satisfy the academic requirements have earned their credential and
will usually believe that it cannot be revoked for non-academic reasons.
2. FormerStudent's PropertyInterestin the Degree
When a student has fulfilled the academic requirements necessary to earn a degree, the student is deprived of a property interest if
that degree is revoked. Degrees granted by a public university have
been recognized by the courts as "a substantial property right that
may only be taken away pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures." 1 7 It has been held that when a substantial property loss is
involved, the courts will require substantial procedures. 1°8'04 N.D. Batra, Can Your Alma Mater Take Away Your Degree?, Pacific News Service,
Aug. 23, 1999, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
105 See Alexis B. Offen, FormerStudent Sues MIT after Diploma Suspended, Claims Broken Contract,U. WIRE, Nov. 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, U-Wire File.
106 Id. (quoting Boston attorney Harry A. Silvergate, who has researched discipline procedures at over 400 schools).
107 Robert Gilbert Johnston & Jane D. Oswald, Academic Dishonesty: Revoking Academic
Credentials,32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 67, 80 (1998) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541 (1985)).
'08 See ifL at 82.
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The private school student does not have the same due process
protections as the public school student. The private university student, however, still has an important interest in the degree. Courts
have required private universities to maintain and follow fair procedures in determining what action to take against a student.10 9 Thus,
although courts have not required the same procedures in cases involving private universities as they have in cases involving public
universities, they have required fundamental fairness.
There is another interesting question raised by the revocation of
academic degrees by universities. If the university has the power to
arbitrarily revoke the degree conferred upon a qualified student, is the
reverse also true? May an alumnus return his degree five, ten, or even
twenty years later, if he or she is dissatisfied with the direction the
university decides to head, or is dissatisfied with the result the degree
has rendered in the job market? Could the student demand her money
back?'" If the student-university relationship is a contractual one,
and the university has guaranteed satisfaction as part of the terms, it
seems that the student could return his degree in the same way that
the university could revoke a degree for violating the student handbook twenty years before. The reason for returning the degree could
be as arbitrary as those reasons universities have used to revoke degrees.
C. Model Suggested to Address Problemsof Revocation ofAcademic
Degreesfor Non-Academic Reasons
1. Do Away with the Public-PrivateDistinction
There is a vast difference in the way courts enforce student protections between public and private universities. Public university
students are given constitutional protections of due process, while
private university students are given "fundamental fairness." Many
have argued that the distinction between the two requirements is artificial." In Slaughter v. Brigham Young University,"2 for example,
the Tenth Circuit held that there was no need to draw a distinction
between public and private university requirements. The court held
that the proceedings followed by Brigham Young "met the requirements of the constitutional procedural due process doctrine as it presently applied to public universities," and thus the distinction between
public and private was unnecessary in that case. 113 Noting that the
Slaughter opinion "may exemplify courts' recognition of an artificial
'09 See id. at 83.
110 See Batra, supranote 104.

,. See Johnston & Oswald, supranote 107, at 83.
112 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1975).
1I3

Id.
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distinction in process due to a student between public and private institutions," Johnston and Oswald conclude that "[f]undamental fairness to a student in a private setting dictates that the student should be
afforded at least the same basic protections as their peers in the public
sector."",14
Without these constitutional safeguards, students at private
schools are turning to the contract theory to provide protection from
arbitrary school action. The protections offered under the contract
theory are in some cases even greater than those afforded by due process. The student-university relationship implies a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that the university must uphold when disciplining students.'" 5 A private university may not act arbitrarily in dealing
with a student. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
equivalent to due process." 6 A student's decision to attend a private
college should not mean that the student gives up his or her right to
fair disciplinary procedures. All schools, public and private, should
be held to the same standards.
Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that the distinction between
public and private universities goes beyond semantics. In a private
university setting, a student may not bring a Fourteenth Amendment
claim against the university unless the student can show that the imposition of sanctions was the result of state action (e.g. the breach of a
rule mandated by the government). A finding of "state action" in pri-7
vate school activity that is not mandated by government is unlikely.1
Even the actions of private schools that receive large amounts of gov-8
ernment aid have been held beyond the penumbra of "state action.""
Although the two types of universities are very different, and are
treated differently in many respects, the two should not be distinguished when it comes to the revocation of academic degrees.
For years courts have "chipped away at the state action barrier."" 9 By slowly eroding the barrier, they have collapsed the distinction between public and private universities in the area of disciplinary procedures. As early as 1971, a New York superior court held
that Hofstra University, a private university, had to observe constitu-

114

Johnston & Oswald, supranote 107, at 84.

,isSee id. at 83-84.
116 See id.
117 See Douglas K Richmond, Students' Right to Counsel in University DisciplinaryProceedings, 15 J.C. & U.L. 289, 306-08 (1989) (noting that attempts to challenge the actions of
private institutions through constitutional means under various theories have had little success).
,18See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1981) (citing other Supreme Court
opinions for the proposition that private action cannot be ascribed to the state unless the state
has "exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the school must in law be deemed to be that of the State").
119 Richmond, supranote 117, at 308.
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120
tional due process requirements in student disciplinary proceedings.
One commentator has observed that "[a]lthough the doctrinal bases
for procedural rights may differ between public and private colleges,
and most courts continue to afford public institutions greater flexibility, the law appears to be moving toward a similarity of treatment."12 1
Courts testing the arbitrariness of dismissals have used due process as a guideline in private university cases where "the actions or
words of the university administration [create] an expectation of due
process."' 2 2 Although due process is not in fact being applied, the
arbitrary and capricious test stemming from the contractual theory
creates a duty on behalf of the private university to act fairly, even if
due process is not technically required. Interestingly, non-legal forces
have caused further erosion in the distinction between public and private universities in that most private universities afford constitutionally adequate procedural protection, even though they are not compelled by law to do so, because of economic considerations. 123
The distinction between public and private universities should be
collapsed in the limited area of degree revocation. Courts have been
struggling with the distinction for many years as they skirt the due
process and state action blockade through use of the "fundamental
fairness" requirement. Universities should be put on notice that they
are required to provide the same protection to students, regardless of
whether they are state-supported or private, in the context of degree
revocation.
120 See Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 324 N.Y.S.2d 964, 982-84 (N.Y. 1971). However, the court

predicated direct application of constitutional due process on three theories, two of which have
since been rejected and another which is tenuous in application. The court made much of the
fact that "Hofstra [discharged] a public function for the state, as part of a State policy of mobilizing higher education resources." Id. at 982. However, Professor Richmond observes that the
"public function" theory has been "rejected." See Richmond, supra note 117, at 307. Moreover, the court implied that the fact that Hofstra was "a tax-supported" university further supported its conclusion. Such a theory was explicitly rejected in Rendell-Baker. Finally, the third
rationale offered by the court was that the state exercised "dominance" over Hofstra by its "right
and ability" to regulate dormitories. Ryan, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 983. Though the state did not actively regulate in this manner, the court concluded that state action was established on the basis
that it could have done so. See id.
12' Richmond, supra note 117, at 309.
122 Carol J. Perkins, Note, Sylvester v. Texas Southern University: An Exception to the
Rule of JudicialDeference to Academic Decisions, 25 J.C. & U.L. 399, 417-18 (1998).
123 See id. Perkins writes:
It seems to me unthinkable that the faculty and administration of any private
institution would consider recognizing fewer rights in their students than the minimum the Constitution exacts of the state universities, or that their students would
long remain quiescent if a private college were to embark on such a benighted
course. Thus, as a practical matter, almost every private college and university will
commit itself to giving students facing dismissal at least as much notice and hearing
as the Constitution compels public colleges and universities to give their students;
however, this is not because of any legal compulsion but... because they exist in a
highly competitive market for those students.
Id. at 417-18 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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2. Degree Revocationsfor Non-Academic Reasons Should Require
the Most Strict Procedures
A review of the relevant case law reveals a clear pattern. The
strictness of the procedures that courts require universities to observe
can be placed on a sliding scale depending on the nature of the proceeding, with suspensions and expulsions for academic reasons on
one end, the lenient end, and discipline for non-academic conduct on
the other, more strict end. This is as it should be. Courts are loathe to
intrude on the academic decisions of educators 2 4 and have stated repeatedly that, in cases of academic suspensions and expulsions, no
hearing is required.125 In the case of degree revocations for academic
reasons, the courts require additional procedures, including a hearing,
although in these cases courts still defer to educators because of their
reluctance to second-guess academic decisions. 126 Judicial scrutiny of
discipline based on non-academic conduct is a notch further up the
strictness scale. The conduct at issue in these cases falls outside the
realm of academic expertise, and courts therefore are more comfortable in closely scrutinizing these decisions in this area. Nonacademic suspensions and expulsions require notice and a hearing. 127
The courts' scrutiny of degree revocations for non-academic reasons should move all the way to the strict end of the scale and require
the most stringent of procedures. In these cases the university is trying, on the basis of non-academic conduct, to deprive the former student of a degree in which he or she has a property interest. The importance of the student's interest in the degree and the potential for
abuse by the university in this situation make it entirely logical and
appropriate that courts should treat this most severe form of discipline
with the highest degree of scrutiny, and that they require the most
strict procedural safeguards for the protection of former students.
Yoo was stripped of his degree without a fair hearing. Moreover, the
decision to revoke his degree was not made by an impartial tribunal
but rather by the university administration-an interested party. Such
an abuse of power can be curtailed if the courts employed a higher
form of scrutiny when evaluating such cases. Such higher scrutiny is
necessary to protect former students' interests and expectations.

124

See supranote 15.

125 See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-91 (1978)

(holding that a formal hearing is not required in cases involving academic expulsion).
126 See, e.g., Waliga v. Kent State Univ., 488 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ohio 1986) (holding that a
hearing must be afforded to the student in cases involving degree revocation).
127 See, e.g., Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87-91 (1978) (explaining that disciplinary violations
require fact finding).
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3. The Need for a Defined List of Reasonsfor Which a Degree May
Be Revoked
It has been argued that, if universities are permitted to revoke
academic degrees, they should only be permitted to do so in cases of
academic fraud.1 8 When a student fraudulently earns a degree, the
university is justified in taking the degree back because the student
has not in fact earned it. However, when a university revokes a degree for reasons other than academic fraud, "the process becomes
more open to corruption, manipulation, and improper influence."' 129
Limiting revocation power to academic fraud limits the university's
ability to subjectively revoke degrees and forces universities to police
their campus and school while the student is under their jurisdiction
and within their grasp to effectively punish. If the subjectivity is
taken out of the revocation power, schools will not be able to arbitrarily dictate what is revocable activity and what is not. Universities
would be unable to take away a degree based upon unsupported accusations as MIT has done in the Yoo case.
If universities are permitted to revoke degrees for non-academic
reasons, a defined list of infractions for which degrees may be revoked should be established. The list should be established by neutral
parties who can be impartial and unbiased in devising the list of conduct that merits a punishment as severe as revocation of a degree. An
expert commission that understands academic institutions and that
will take into account the interests of both students and universities
should be formed to compile such a list. If universities are left to
formulate their own such lists of conduct deserving of punishment by
revocation, incidents such as the one at MIT are unavoidable.
The MIT handbook states that a degree may be revoked or suspended after graduation for acts that occurred before graduation, but
were unknown to the university at that time.1 30 A Boston attorney
who has researched disciplinary policies at over 400 schools has
stated that MIT's diploma suspension represents "an abuse of
power. ' 13 1 The vague language of the handbook gives the university
too much freedom to take a precious asset from a former student.
Without a clearly defined list of conduct that justifies the revocation
of academic degrees, the power will be abused, as it was in the case
of Yoo.

128

See Institutions Should Not Revoke Degreesfor Any Reason Except Academic Fraud,

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 17, 1999, at B3 (compilation of letters to the editor that include
those by professors outraged by MUT's revocation of Yoo's degree).
129 Id.
130 See Reisberg, supranote 5, at A4.
131 Offen, supranote 105.
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4. EstablishProceduresThat Must Be Followed
In addition to limiting the revocation of degrees to a clearly defined list of non-academic infractions, universities should also be required to follow a uniform set of specific procedures in such cases.
Most importantly, the decision to revoke a former student's degree
should be made by a neutral tribunal-i.e., a court of competent jurisdiction-and only after a hearing in which both sides have an opportunity to be heard. Although this may appear to invade the scope of
universities' autonomy, it must be recognized that the relationship
between students and universities undergoes a dramatic change with
the conferral of the degree. When a student graduates, he leaves his
alma mater and itsjurisdictionover him behind:
Graduation is an aoristic, punctiliar event that forever alters
the student-university relationship; for the university to be
able to unilaterally reinstate that relationship and compel a
student to defend himself on university premises according to
the university's own rules is a miscarriage of justice. Academic dishonesty is not to be condoned but revocation of an
important property interest without benefit of full legal proc132
ess within the legal system is likewise not to be condoned.
During their time at the university, students are subject to disciplinary hearings and the jurisdiction of the school. Once graduation
takes place, however, the university and the student no longer have
the same relationship, and the revocation decision must therefore be
made by an independent tribunal. Many commentators agree that the
courtroom, not a university proceeding, should be the forum in which
the revocation is decided. For example, Mawdsley writes:
[W]here there is no student-university relationship at all (as
would be the case when a student has graduated) courts
should require the university to use the legal system. To treat
a degree revocation as an isolated occurrence like a grade in
an academic course is hopelessly myopic. . . . Considering
the long-range harmful effects on the student to his or her
personal and professional life, should not the university's
case be subjected to more vigorous scrutiny than133the informal
and self-serving review by the university itself?
There is a real problem of bias when a university holds a hearing
to decide whether to revoke a degree:
132 Ralph D. Mawdsley, Judicial Deference: A Doctrine Misapplied to Degree Revoca-

tions, 70 EDUC. L. REP. 1043, 1052-53 (1992).
133 Id. at 1052.
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[F]aculty members, administrators, and students may have
distinct impressions of a student, especially when he or she is
a member of a small community. An administrator may have
had prior contact with the student in other disciplinary matters that may have not gone to the tribunal. Further, the
charges may be due to maladministration by the university
official. Finally, student disciplinary board members may
134 be
subjected to extreme peer pressure from other students.
One of the most important aspects of a trial is that the presiding
judge and jury be unbiased. 135 Thus, it is important that universities
be required to submit to such unbiased tribunals when something as
critical as degree revocation is at issue. The requirements should be
identical for all universities. Having an impartial tribunal decide the
case based on a list of conduct that merits revocation reduces the
subjectivity involved in the process and36lessens the potential for abuse
of power on the part of the university.
The court system is the proper place for the student to be heard
and for the university to be held accountable. Too much power
granted to the university can mean disaster to students everywhere.
Charles Yoo's life will never be the same now that MIT suspended
his degree. He is unable to attend business school, and he will forever
be stigmatized as the result of a decision made without his having the
ability to confront his accusers and defend himself. He has effectively been labeled a criminal, a murderer, despite the fact that he was
never criminally charged. MIT is not the only university that will
abuse its power and damage its former students' lives.
Courts, educators, and concerned citizens must work together to
protect the interests of students. Practically speaking, the procedures
outlined in this Comment would have to be imposed through legislation. But such legislation is necessary to create a cause of action to be
brought before the impartial tribunal so that justice can truly be
served, and the interests of former students can be protected.
CONCLUSION

Once a student graduates from a university, the relationship between the student and the university has changed forever. It is not
acceptable for the university to unilaterally decide to revoke an im134 Walter Saurack, Note, Protecting the Student: A Critique of the ProceduralProtection
Afforded to American and English Students in University Disciplinary Hearings,22 J.C. & U.L.
785, 816-17 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
...See id. at 816.
136 See id. ("Considering the long-range harmful effects on the student to his
or her personal life, should not the university's case be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny than the informal and self-serving review by the university itself?").

2001]

REVOCATION OF ACADEMIC DEGREES

portant interest that belongs to a former student. If universities are
permitted to revoke degrees for non-academic conduct, there is a real
danger that universities will abuse their power and former students
everywhere will be irreparably harmed without adequate safeguards
to prevent abuses. This danger exists in part because each institution
decides for itself which behaviors constitute revocable conduct. Students have a property interest in their degrees. If degree revocations
for non-academic reasons are to be permitted at all, there must be
procedures in place to combat abuse by universities. These should
include: (1) ending the procedural distinction between public and private universities in the limited area of degree revocation for nonacademic reasons; (2) close judicial scrutiny of educators' decisions
in this area, as well as a requirement of strict procedural safeguards;
(3) creating a list of conduct that merits degree revocation; and (4)
establishing specific procedures that universities must follow to properly revoke a degree, including using the legal system (an impartial
tribunal) to decide if degree revocation is proper and fair to the student. The distinction between academic and non-academic proceedings must remain firmly in place regardless of the Goodreau court's
statement.
MIT should not be permitted to revoke Yoo's degree for five
minutes, five years or forever, but if it is, the suggestions above
should be followed to ensure that Yoo is treated fairly and that his
valuable property interest is not taken without sufficient justification.
He fulfilled the requirements to graduate, and paid $100,000 to attend, and thus he deserves no less.
JAYME L. BUTCHERt
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